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Book Reviews 
Social Justice and the Liberal State 
Bruce Ackerman 
Yale University Press, 1980, 416 pp. , $17.50. 
Ackerman has given us another look at what is perhaps th e most important 
m oral and political struggle of our day. On the one side are those of us who 
believe, as did Pope John XXIII, that God 's law is immanent in human nature. On 
the oth er side are Ackerman's kind of liberals who believe all political organiza-
tions ought to be neutral regarding questions of good and evil. Good Pope John 
wrote in his famous encyclical Pacem in Terris that peace depends upon the moral 
order revealed by God in the human nature He created: 
Peace on earth, which all men of every era have most eagerly yearned for, 
can be firmly established only if the order laid down by God be dutifully 
observed. 
The progress of learning and the inventions of technology clearly show 
that, both in living things and in the forces of nature, an astonishing order 
reigns, and they also bear witness to the greatness of man, who can under-
stand that order and can create suitable instruments to harness those forces 
of nature and use them to his benefit. 
But the progress of science and the inventions of technology show above 
all the infinite greatness of God, Who created the universe and man himself. 
He created all things out of nothing, pouring into them the abundance of 
His wisdom and goodness, so that th e h o ly psalmist praises God in these 
words: ' 0 Lord our master, the majesty of thy name fills all the earth.' . .. 
How strongly does the turmoil of individual men and peoples contrast 
with the perfect order of the universe! It is as if the relationships which bind 
them together could be controlled only by force. 
But the Creator of the world h as imprinted in man's heart an order which 
his conscience reveals to him and enjoins him to obey: 'This shows that the 
obligations of the law are written in their hearts: their conscience utters its 
own testimony.' .. . 
But fickleness of opinion often produces this error, that many think that 
the relationships between man and States can be governed by the same laws 
as the forces and irrational elements of the universe, whereas the laws 
governing them are of quite a different kind and are to be sought elsewhere, 
namely, where t he F ather of all things wrote them , that is, in the nature of 
man. 
(Excerpts from the first six paragraphs of the encyclical, N.C.W.C. trans-
lation, St. Paul Editions.) 
In sharp contrast, Ackerman says: 
... nobody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a privi-
leged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest of us. A power 
structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through a conversation in 
which some person (or group) must assert that he is (or they are) the 
privileged moral authority: 
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason (for exercising power) if it requires 
the power holder to assert: 
a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of 
his fellow citizens, or 
b) tha t, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically super-
ior to one or more of his fellow citizens (pp. 10-11). 
For Ackerman, political power should be exercised under constraints generated 
by, and scarce resources allocated according to, the deliberations of a universal 
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dialogue in which no one claims to know what actually is good when another 
citizen participating in the dialogue claims he cannot see it, and in which no one 
claims superiority of any kind. All participants must be able to say to each other, 
"I'm at least as good as you are" (p. 66 and throughout the book). Thus Acker-
man proposes another liberal convention in the face of what he thinks is legit-
imate agnosticism regarding the natural law. 
The dilemma is real. Either morality is conventional and subjective (e.g., Acker-
man's liberalism), or it is part of the real order of things which we do not make 
up - i.e., morality is objective, as in Pope John's understanding of the nature of 
man. 
[There have been many attempts to circumvent this dilemma and find a middle 
ground. Kant, for example, set the tone for the German Enlightenment by propos-
ing a middle ground between these two positions. Morality would be subjective in 
that he claimed no knowledge of reality apart from man's mind as a source for 
moral principles, but it would have certain "objective" characteristics in that he 
mistakenly believed that we could find substantive universal principles immanent 
in ou r reason apart from any metaphysical or religious knowledge of realities 
beyond our reason. I believe that this effort, all owing for notable exceptions such 
as Alan Donegan 's recent work, has notoriously failed to result in anything prac-
tically different from the conventional morality of liberalism. Donegan's book, 
The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago, 1977), which stands in wonderful 
contrast to Ackerman's, does not have the political clout of the latter ' s brand of 
liberalism, and seems impotent in the face of it. One reason is that Donegan, the 
Kantian, cannot ground the traditional morality of the family in reason alone, and 
withou t that morality his opposition to abortion, for example, is without force. 
So once again the middle-ground collapses, practically speaking, into the conven-
tiona l morality of liberalism . ) 
Ackerman is proposing a new convention to replace earlier ones such as the 
traditional social contract and Utilitarianism's felici fic calculus or even more 
recent conventions such as Rawls's justice as fairness, because critics h ave demon-
strated that these conventions cannot consistently generate principles for con-
straining political power where such constraint is absolu tely needed. Ackerman 
believes his convention will succeed where others have failed. 
It is regrettable that Ackerman exhibits no real knowledge of how natural law 
theorists and others who defend knowledge of an objective moral order propose 
constraining the power of the state, because Ackerman's only real appeal is to a 
sense of fair play in the face of a bug-a-boo. He believes that claims to know the 
truth about what is objectively good lead to paternalism and even to tyranny . Iron-
ically , liberalism's historical failures, both in the face of the rise of private 
economic power under liberal capitalism and in face of the rise of modern 
tyrannies, particularly of the Nazi and Communist varieties, provide persuasive 
reasons for believing (as I do) that liberalism cannot generate effective principles, 
let a lone self-consistent principles, for the constraint of power. Liberalism leads, 
as C. S. Lewis said, to The Abolition of Man. 
The principal reason for liberalism's fai lu res is clear in Ackerman 's work. No 
liberal convention, not even Ackerman's, includes everybody within the conven-
tion; so, not every instance of innocent human life is protected from arbitrary 
killing by either the state or private individuals. (Directly killing the innocent 
would be wrong even if thought not to be "arbitrary.") Some human beings are 
left out of all conventions. To include everybody, we must appeal to truths about 
which liberals insist on remaining agnostic. In effect, we must appeal to knowl-
edge of the sacred value of every innocent human life . This truth has been greatly 
amplified, if not simply discovered, by Hebrew-Christian faith . I might say that it 
has been very especially amplified in our day by the transcendent knowledge and 
religious faith of Catholics li ke Pope John XXIII and Pope John Paul II. 
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Ackerman's liberal convention excludes, at least, unborn babies. No unborn 
baby can say to a citizen, "I'm at least as good as you are," because the baby 
cannot yet speak. Ackerman, with that blindness the psalmist called foolishness, 
does not see that the exclusion is arbitrary. He thinks it is well-reasoned. But no 
amount of specious reasoning can discount the fact that a vast number of inno-
cent and flourishing human lives are terminated (i.e., directly killed) by those who 
practice abortion. The "reason" this group is singled ou t for slaughter is not a 
reason; it is as arbitrary as using race as a "reason" for discrimination. I repeat 
that directly killing the innocent, which is what abortion is, would be wrong even 
if choosing to allow the direct killing at will of members of this group (which 
consists of unborn human babies) were not arbitrary. But in fact it is arbitrary, 
and the fact that its arbitrariness is merely disguised by specious reasoning means 
that inevitably some citizens will argue effectively that yet another group can be 
excluded from the convention and therefore killed at will by either the state or 
private individuals. Unborn babies are simply not the only people who cannot 
insist that "I'm at least as good as you are," and you have got to be able to 
maintain that in order to belong to Ackerman's convention. 
For example, I do not think that many who accept Ackerman's arguments for 
abortion will find his arguments against infanticide compelling. Ackerman believes 
the "right" to an abortion is so broad that he will allow the majority to restrain 
abortions only when they are instances of what he would consider wanton 
cruelty - people conceiving babies (he calls them fetuses) only for the fun of 
having them aborted. In the face of this concession he actually thinks the follow-
'ng argument would check infanticide: 
By the time a fetus is viable outside the womb, the problem (of killing) 
has changed in two respects. First, the biological parents have had time to 
consider whether they want to be parents. While the right to abortion 
typically protects against the failures of contraception, this rationale seems 
weaker when the parents allow so many months to pass. Second, once the 
infant is viable, some other adult may want to take on the task of child 
rearing. The question, then, is whether a "natural" parent has the right to 
kill the child rather than transfer it to a parent who wants to "adopt" it. 
This is not a rhetorical question. We have already seen, in chapter 2, that 
Ascetic does have the right to burn his fair share of manna despite the fact 
that others think he is "wasting" it. Moreover, a day-old infant is no more a 
citizen than a nine-month fetus. What is required, then, is a liberal argument 
for denying citizens the right to kill their newborn children while saving 
their right to consume other forms of material reality in the way they think 
best. 
I can think of at least two. The first emphasizes the rights of the adoptive 
parents. To make the case easy, assume that the adoptive parents are 
infertile and that, for second-best reasons, they are denied access to a test-
tube baby. It follows that these people have been consigned to a power 
structure that denies them a prima facie right they may value dearly. A very 
minimal second-best response might be to guarantee them access to children 
who would otherwise be killed by their "natural" parents. 
A second argument extends the principle against wanton cruelty devel-
oped in our discussion of abortion. In the present case, the "natural" 
parents have it within their power simply to pass the child on to another, 
yet they prefer to kill it instead. What other reason can they give for their 
action but their desire to impose pain upon mute creation (pp. 128-129)? 
Liberalism's ruminations, when they do not abet killing, as in the case of 
abortion, are simply impotent before Cain's urge to kill. Although sin remains, 
that fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom, is not completely impotent 
before the urge to kill the innocent. Knowledge of the objective moral order can 
lead to tha t fear. 
It seems unnecessary to add that acceptance of Ackerman's liberal convention 
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would lead to a worsening of the situation in medical practice today, if for no 
other reason than what we have seen - he rationalizes abortion on demana. 
Therefore, I do not recommend the book. But if you are not familiar with the 
contemporary liberal mind, Ackerman's book will abundantly satisfy your curiosity. 
- Richard R. Roach, S.J., Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Moral Theology 
Marquette University 
Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach 
to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine 
Albert R. Johnsen, Ph.D. ; Mark Siegler, M.D.; 
and William J. Winslade, Ph.D., J.D. 
Macmillan, New York, 1982, xvii + 187 pp. 
This book is designed to be a desk reference in medical ethics for practicing 
physicians. It is ordered to the practical resolution of concrete cases that clinicians 
frequently face, and it explicitly avoids becoming involved in abstruse theoretical 
arguments, ethical theories and speculation. A very well organized book, it enables 
physicians to come to ethical judgments in the same manner that they formulate 
clinical judgments, for the text employs the contemporary medical clinical diag· 
nostic model used in medical practice. 
There are many serious problems with this book, the least of which is the belief 
that one can adequately analyze ethical situations in a manner analogous to the 
way in which clinical problems are analyzed. The practical ethical judgments and 
suggestions made in this work are based on a subjective, intuitive, utilitarian and 
quality-of-life theory of ethics, and little mention is made of the weaknesses of a 
theory such as this. No justification is given for the adoption of this theory of 
ethics, and this could easily lead unsuspecting clinical practitioners to believe that 
there is general agreement abou t the validity of this theory and the suggestions 
derived from it. While this book gives very detailed accounts of specific medical 
cases, the moral principles invoked to resolve these cases are often ambiguous and 
confused. For example, it is suggested that practitioners ought to respect the 
desire of some patients to die with dignity and have active euthanasia imposed on 
them. But elsewhere, readers are warned of the legal dangers of becoming involved 
in assisting in the death of patients. As a result, the reader is left in a state of 
doubt as to whether cooperation in this practice should be offered. 
The utilitarian and anti-speculative approach of this work creates serious diffi-
culties for the clinical practitioner. This is because the work assumes that sound 
ethical judgments can be reached by a "rough" weighing of the values involved in 
specific cases. The problem with this approach is that more than a "rough" 
weighing of values is required for sound resolution of the truly difficult ethical 
cases. The difficult moral cases, those which seriously challenge the capabilities of 
an ethical theory, are those in which the values in conflict are very similar in 
nature. It is easy to decide what is to be done when one is deciding between silk 
purses and sows' ears. But when one must compare the equally incomparable 
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